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ABSTRACT
Following the historic election of Barack Obama, the largest overhaul of the nation’s
health care system since the Great Society, and with the country still reeling from the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression, a group of disenchanted conservative
Republicans and elected leaders wary of government policy gave rise to a new political
movement – the Tea Party. Since taking the American political system by storm in 2010,
considerable research has focused on the electoral consequences of the Tea Party. Using an
original dataset and the American National Election Study, I study the Tea Party Caucus at the
elite level by analyzing roll call votes, incumbency, and endorsements, and at the mass level
through an examination of congressional districts and constituencies. Findings show that
members of the Tea Party Caucus and their Republican House colleagues are largely
homogeneous. Exceptions to this include economic final passage votes, legislation receiving
presidential support, district lean, census region, and presidential vote in congressional districts.
Furthermore, evidence is seen that economic factors in members’ districts affected the election of
freshmen representatives in 2010, and that district variables strongly influence legislative voting
behavior. Finally, discontinuity is discovered between the Tea Party movement at the mass level
and the Tea Party Caucus at the elite level.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Political movements often gain prominence around highly salient public issues such as
suffrage, civil rights, war, or a difficult economic period. Since 2009, a new movement – the Tea
Party – has taken the American political system by storm, captivating the media as well as the
minds of ordinary Americans and political elites (Gallagher and Rock 2012). Popular consensus
and academic research (Abramowitz 2011; Campbell and Putnam 2011; Arceneaux and
Nicholson 2012) hold that the Tea Party encompasses a group of conservative-leaning
Republicans who want a smaller role for government, less regulation, a more robust foreign
policy, and lower taxes. These notions are what we think of the Tea Party, but are they accurate?
While some trace the roots of the Tea Party back to the big-government conservatism of
President George W. Bush (2001–09), the Tea Party that many people came to know emerged
with a thunderous roar during the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
commonly known as health care reform or Obamacare (Berzon et al. 2010). It was then that a
group comprising of Members of Congress (MOC), political talking heads and elites, as well as
concerned citizens, voiced their opposition to Obama’s signature piece of legislation during his
first term (2009–13). This group espoused conservative philosophies, like limited government,
personal choice, and tax reduction.
The Great Recession that encompassed the nation from 2007 to 2009 forced the federal
government to undertake a wide array of actions to help stabilize and revitalize the country’s
economy. Among these were a small stimulus package in early 2008 (Economic Stimulus Act),
the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008 which included the
Toxic Asset Relief Program (TARP), and bailouts of the financial and automotive industries that
amounted to trillions of dollars in government spending. Expenditures of this nature continued
1

into the Obama administration, most notably with the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, commonly known as the stimulus. In addition, economic matters were widely cited in the
bitter debate over health care reform that took place in late 2009 and early 2010. Even though the
dispute over health care may have been a turning point in the movement, garnering it global
attention and curiosity, high stakes political fights continued long after over such issues as the
loans extended to the American automakers, home foreclosure and refinancing programs,
extended unemployment benefits, and the federal deficit and debt among many others. The clash
over health care reform continues as well, with the House voting on legislation to repeal or
significantly alter Obamacare more than thirty times in the 112th Congress.
Whether one sees the Tea Party traced back to the spending and government actions
taken place under Bush or not, the movement clearly gained steam on February 19, 2009 – long
before the debate over health care reform gained traction – after an upset CNBC correspondent,
Rick Santelli, took to the airwaves live from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
merely two days after the recovery act was signed into law. To the cheering of traders around
him, Santelli who was clearly upset with the stimulus package and the Homeowners
Affordability and Stability Plan – a roadmap to help families avoid foreclosure – suggested a Tea
Party be held on the Chicago River in July. Overnight the video became a viral sensation and
within days Santelli became a national figure, and the moniker “Tea Party” had taken hold (Rae
2011).
During the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans bolstered by the energy and enthusiasm
of the Tea Party movement gained 63 seats in the House, and 6 in the Senate. The election
resulted in the largest net seat gain in the House since the GOP gained 81 seats in the 1938
midterm elections – which itself occurred following the Recession of 1937 (Carson 2001).
2

Whether the Tea Party, as popularly thought, was actually responsible for the Republican surge
is investigated as I explore previous literature on the subject, as are claims about endorsements
and the motivations of the movement.
At this date, inquiries into the Tea Party movement lack research concerning the officials
who were elected and who benefited due to the Tea Party. Research mainly focuses on the 2010
election and not the post-election period. This study focuses specifically on the Tea Party Caucus
(henceforth referred to as “TPC”) in the United States House of Representatives during the 112th
Congress, and focuses on their legislative voting record, as well as their districts and
constituencies, and incumbency – topics not yet subjected to rigorous analysis. By creating an
original dataset and using the 2012 American National Election Study, I analyze the TPC by
examining the legislative voting behavior of House Republicans, their districts, patterns of
incumbency and endorsements, and the roll of constituency influence in roll call voting. These
results will allow the comparison of TPC members to their House Republican colleagues (herein
after referred to as “Establishment Republicans” or “ER”) to determine if the two groups differ at
statistically significant levels. The data will also examine the electoral forces at play in 2010,
allowing the determination of whether the Tea Party was indeed principally responsible for the
Republican surge or if it was the result of predetermined factors (Democratic overextension in
2006 and 2008, the economy, etc.).
In the following sections, previous research conducted on the Tea Party movement and
the limited scope of these studies is examined. The importance and significance of this paper is
detailed, six hypotheses are presented, and the variables and methodology used to construct the
dataset and conduct the analysis will be discussed. Following this, an exploration of the findings
of the research is performed, and conclusions are drawn from the analysis conducted. The paper
3

concludes by discussing what the findings mean for the Tea Party movement, and identifies
future avenues of research concerning the TPC.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
“Hell no you can't,” “You lie!” and “Job killing,” are some of the most notorious and
well-known expressions of the Tea Party. These phrases help to steer the public and academic
image of the Tea Party as a libertarian leaning anti-government grassroots movement that gained
notoriety and influence because its tenets are universally acceptable and popular, i.e., a smaller
and more responsible government, lesser taxes, a more accountable Congress, and a strong and
robust foreign policy. Author Ron Suskind (2011, 335) writes,
The Tea Party’s platform is populist, both conservative and libertarian, endorsing lower
taxes, a reduction of national debt, and a reduction in government spending, along with
individual rights and an ‘originalist’ interpretation of the Constitution. But […] a lot of
Tea Party activists, didn’t offer much in the way of an actual program or coherent
policies. Tea Partiers are often against things that are themselves opposites, and against
pretty much anything that Obama does.
As noted by Suskind (2011), some see the movement as an anti-Obama faction, possibly
furthered by not only those who vehemently oppose his policies, but those who also dislike him
because of his background and history (Parker 2010).
While some (Specter and Robbins 2012) trace the roots of the Tea Party movement back
to the big-government conservatism of George W. Bush, the group that most came to recognize
emerged in 2009 following the inauguration of President Barack Obama (Boykoff and Laschever
2011). It was at this time that a group comprising of Members of Congress (MOC), political
elites, and concerned citizens, voiced their opposition to Obama’s legislative agenda. The Tea
Party espoused conservative philosophies, such as small government and lower taxation (Barreto
et al. 2011). The Tea Party quickly gained national attention, and even faster became a powerful
political force across America – as evidenced by the 2010 election.
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To begin, I quickly explore the history of the Tea Party movement. This serves two
purposes. First, to provide a baseline on its history from which the study begins, and second, to
state a number of the preconceived notions – both academically and publically held – about the
movement. Though the Tea Party movement drew much attention from the media, it would not
be until 2010 that a self-identified Tea Party supporter would be elected to Congress. The
group’s first election is often seen as that of then-Massachusetts State Senator Scott Brown to fill
the seat held for almost 47 years by the late Senator Edward Kennedy (Rae 2011). Research by
Abramowitz (2011), Jacobson (2011), and Campbell and Putnam (2011), among others, mainly
focuses on what may be identified as the social and electoral implications of the Tea Party
movement. At this date, studies involving the Tea Party movement lack post-election analysis
concerning legislators since the 2010 election.
Six months after Brown’s election to the Senate, Minnesota Congresswoman Michele
Bachmann founded the TPC in the House in July 2010. Fifty-two members joined the caucus that
month. Following the Republican surge in the 2010 midterm elections in which the GOP gained
sixty-three seats and took control of the House, the House Republican Conference gave birth to a
freshly minted 60 member TPC headed by Bachmann (Phillips 2012). The “shellacking”
experienced by Democrats – a term used by the president in a press conference two-days after
the election – is often attributed to disapproval of Obama and Congress’ handling of the
economy (Campbell 2010). Hibbing and Tirtitilli (2000) found in their study of the 1994
midterm election that Congressional disapproval can result in votes against the majority party –
in 2010, the Democrats – and this may have resulted in an increase in Democratic seat losses,
coupled with Democratic overextension in 2006 and 2008. Furthermore, a seat swing the size of
2010’s greatly affected the level of polarization within Congress, as evidenced by Lewis, Poole,
6

and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores for the 112th Congress. These scores indicate that the
112th Congress was the most polarized ever (Matthews 2013). As seen in their data since the
1980’s, the House continues to see higher levels of polarization than the Senate, though both
chambers are at their highest recorded levels. The 2010 election ousted a large number of Blue
Dog Democrats in favor of TPC members. This resulted in an increasingly conservative GOP
Conference, and a progressively more liberal Democratic caucus. In addition, the 2006 and 2008
election losses by Republicans had the same effect of ousting vulnerable members, resulting in a
group that was already leaning far to the right.
The 2006 and 2008 elections resulted in congressional parties that were more
homogeneous intraparty, the GOP moving further to the right and the Democrats leaning farther
to the left. Though, the loss of more moderate members also caused a deeper divide on issues
between the two major parties. Polarization is an important topic to discuss because of its effects
at both the elite and mass levels. Also, polarization at the elite level has led to the electorate
becoming marginally more polarized as well. This polarization at the mass level is likely to
manifest in the most politically engaged part of the electorate, a segment in which Tea Party falls
(Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz 2011). Prior literature on caucus membership provides
explanations for why legislators join congressional caucuses. Hammond (1998) developed a
typology of caucuses divided into six categories: party affiliation, personal interest, national
constituency, regional, state or district, and industry. The TPC best fits into Hammond’s (1998,
31) party affiliation category, whose goal is to “articulate and advance the policy views of an
intraparty group.”
The two main focusing points of this research is the crossroads between the TPC and
legislative voting, and the MOC’s election – at the elite level and mass level. First, is the
7

investigation of legislative voting behavior. Previous studies have shown differences between
procedural votes, final passage votes, and other forms of voting (Patty 2005; Poole and
Rosenthal 2000; Theriault 2008; Jessee and Theriault 2012). Phillips (2012) found disparities
between economic and non-economic votes when examining the TPC, and greater amounts of
partisan cohesion on procedural votes. Increased public and media attention on final passage
votes, and district level factors, including the electoral consequences of the MOC’s vote
influence these variations (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989; Gallagher and Rock 2012; Jessee and
Theriault 2012). Previous research (Abramowitz 2011; Campbell and Putnam 2011; Jacobson
2011; Arceneaux and Nicholson 2012) clearly identifies the Tea Party as a partisan intraparty
movement. This classification is congruous with the party affiliation caucus category of
Hammond (1998).
Operational definitions of the variables are provided later. The analysis of legislative roll
call voting is broken into three parts: economic, non-economic, and foreign and security policy –
to be explained in more detail in subsequent sections. Some cases to be examined may span
multiple policy areas. One of these is the annual defense authorization act, a bill which funds the
operations of the Department of Defense for the upcoming fiscal year. This spans all three voting
categories, covering economic, domestic, and foreign policy. Manning (1977) studied the
relationship between the legislative and executive branches in the foreign policy arena, noting
that certain subjects broach the boundaries of foreign policy and enter the domestic realm.
Manning (1977) coined the term “intermestic” to describe these cases. For the purposes of this
study, defense authorization acts are coded as foreign and security policy votes, as the main
purpose of the bill pertains to the military and foreign policy of the United States.
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Foreign policy votes require study because of the political perspective posited by
McCormick and Wittkopf (1990), in which they found that in the post-Cold War period
interparty partisanship is now central to the executive-congressional relations in the foreign
policy arena. This is contrary to the Cold War period where politics “stopped at the water’s
edge” (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1077). Other research has come to similar conclusions
(Weisberg 1978). Non-economic and social votes are also important to investigate because of
their focus on domestic politics as well as intermestic areas. Arcelus and Meltzer (1975, 1238)
found that principal aggregate effect of economic effects on voting occur because of “changes in
the participation rate and not from shifts between parties.” Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) discover
that voters personally affected by adverse economic conditions (i.e., unemployment, etc.) are not
likely to electorally punish candidates of the incumbent party. Economic voting is instead more
general in nature and based on collective economic judgments of the economy as a whole.
Economic voting is important because economic conditions are thought to be an important factor
in congressional voting, especially in support for incumbent candidates.
Second, I examine research pertaining to constituencies, districts, incumbency, and
elections. Representation is the most fundamental and basic principle of democracy. In the U.S.,
representation is a product of the polity at the state and national levels, highlighted by biannual
elections in the case of the House. Literature focuses on representation both at the micro and
macro level. Micro emphasizes the individual and how they are represented by their MOC,
while, in contrast, macro highlights the aggregate relationship between the median voter and
their representation in Congress. Most academic literature focuses on representation as outlined
by the causal model popularized by Miller and Stokes (1963) in Constituency Influence in
Congress. The model postulates that there are two sources of a representatives roll call voting,
9

their own views and those of their constituents. Perceptions of constituent views can also affect
the representative’s own views, which in turn affects their voting behavior. This forms the basis
of the debate between the trustee and delegate models (Davidson 1969). Representatives are
surprisingly accurate in their prediction of district opinions even following redistricting (Erikson
et al. 1975; Glazer and Robbins 1985). Glazer and Robbins (1985) examined congressional
response to constituency change, i.e. how representatives respond to redistricting. While this is a
topic not measured in this project due to time and resource constraints, their research is notable
because it shows legislators responsiveness to constituent change.
Furthermore, the conceptualization of representation is also vitally important.
Representation must be more broadly defined then simply the level of congruence in attitudes
between constituents and their representatives. Eulau and Karps (1977, 235) define
representation as responsiveness, writing:
Anyone who has the least sensitivity to the representative process recognizes that
representatives are influences in their conduct by many forces or pressures or linkages
other than those arising out of the electoral connection and should realize that restricting
the study of representation to the electoral connection produces a very limited vision of
the representational process.
Eulau and Karps (1977) argue that responsiveness should not be the dependent variable in the
causal structure of representation, instead it should be understood in terms of responsiveness.
Eulau and Karps (1977) outline four main kinds of representation: service responsiveness,
allocation responsiveness, symbolic responsiveness, and policy responsiveness. The last is the
most important as it pertains to this study. Policy responsiveness refers to how a legislators
attitude is related to their constituent’s opinion on a given matter.
Miller and Stokes (1963), and Stokes and Miller (1962), examined congressional
representation and found that constituency attitudes and the perceived preferences of the
10

electorate strongly influence the voting behavior of House members. According to Eulau (1986),
Miller and Stokes provided three conditions that must be met for constituency control. First,
constituents must have a role in recruiting the representative for office, and will often do so with
one who shares common views and values. Second, control can be achieved by threatening the
reelection chances of the representative, forcing them to follow district attitudes. Third, they
posited that the constituency must account for the views of the candidate (Eulau 1986, 453-4).
Downs (1957) argued that due to electoral competition, electoral districts would be
represented by a representative near to district’s median voter. Literature on this subject, and the
relationship between the representative and their constituency is extensive and growing (Calvert
1985; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Whitman 1990). Research shows that partisan constituencies
affect the voting habits and elections of their respective representatives. In their study of elite
polarization, Druckman et al. (2013) found that strengthened partisan identities are linked to
more polarized environments, and that the polarization of elites affects mass level decision
making. Party endorsements are omniportant, and partisans follow their party irregardless of the
strength of the argument made, meaning that citizens are “less likely to consider alternative
positions and more likely to take action based on their opinion” irregardless of its factuality
(Druckman et al. 2013, 74).
Constituencies are also an important topic to study because of the concept of dynamic
representation postulated by Stimson et al. (1995). Dynamic representation is a macro concept
that focuses on electorates by finding that politicians are rational actors that make informed
movement on policy issues based upon an expediency point, a position most likely to benefit the
legislator electorally in the future (Stimson et al. 2013). Interestingly, Stimson et al. (2013, 75)
find that politicians oblige when the electorate indicates they want a change to a more activist or
11

conservative government. With previous research (Phillips 2012) finding TPC members come
from highly partisan constituencies, as seen by examining the Cook Partisan Voting Index
(CPVI), representation and constituencies are an important topic to investigate. They possibly
provide a significant step in determining the strength and motivations of the TPC, and could also
provide a basis for voting behavior. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011, 794) discover that “[Tea
Party] Members of Congress are not responding to changes in the preferences of constituents so
much as they are responding to an organized interest, and one that put electoral and legislative
politics at the top of its agenda.”
District diversity is another element central to the electoral vulnerability and constituency
responsiveness of House members and a topic of great debate (Bond 1983; Bond et al. 1985;
Davidson 1969; Fiorina 1974; Fenno 1978; Froman 1963; Kingdon 1966; Koetzle 1998). Bond
(1983) and Bond et al. (1985) investigates House races in the 1970’s and finds no correlation
between constituency diversity and increased competition in congressional elections, or
differences in challenger quality in such elections. However, Koetzle (1998) argues that such
competition not only exists but that is significant in House races between 1962 and 1996. If
constituency diversity leads to increased electoral competition, it also has a profound impact on
the representatives’ relationship and responsiveness to their constituents and their policy
positions.
It is also key to understand how constituencies hold their representatives accountable for
their roll call voting. While, partisan electorates reward lawmakers who share their ideological
underpinnings, can a MOC be held accountable for being too partisan? Canes-Wrone et al.
(2002) found that representatives – even those from electorally safe districts – are held
accountable, and face electoral detriment by receiving a lower vote share the more they agree
12

with their party in legislative voting. Canes-Wrone et al. (2002, 138) posit that this occurs
because electoral vulnerability derives from roll call voting, and that moderate voting increases
the safety of a seat. This is referred to as the marginality hypothesis, which holds that legislators
from marginal districts will converge on the median position of their constituents, and this will
be displayed as moderation in their roll call voting. Much research has supported the marginality
hypothesis, and the notion that responsiveness to constituency opinion is crucial to reelection
(Fiorina 1973; MacRae 1952; McClosky et al. 1960; Sinclair-Deckard 1976; Sullivan and
Uslaner 1978; Turner 1953). However, other research has shown that representatives may be
more supportive to constituents of their own party, and that this results in legislation more likely
to be extreme than the median voter (Clinton 2006).
Prior research shows that incumbent legislators benefit from a substantially higher
reelection rate than their counterparts (Abramowitz 1975; Friedman and Holden 2009; Hinckley
1980; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Mayhew 1974). The average reelection rate is near 90% for
incumbent members of the House. Carson, Engstrom and Roberts (2007) also find a direct effect
of incumbency on reelection but also note that candidate quality – operationalized as prior
political experience – is also an important variable in electoral success. Mayhew’s (1974)
research concerning incumbency is regarded as the seminal work in the field, and he finds that
time served, and thus experience, are the most important factors in reelection. Studies at the
individual level have shown that the economy is a salient issue (as it was in 2008, 2010, and
2012) – especially when economic conditions are poor. Voters often reelect incumbents when the
economy expands in election years (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Fiorina 1981). To ensure
reelection, legislators must court both the reelection and primary constituencies expanded upon
by Fenno (1977). In many cases, MOC’s may be more likely to lose their bid for reelection in
13

primaries rather than the general election (Turner 1953). The Tea Party has ousted many GOP
members in primaries since 2010.
Abramowitz (2011, 14-5) analyzes the rise of the Tea Party movement by stating that it
emerged from the “natural outgrowth of the growing size and conservatism of the activist base of
the Republican Party during the preceding decades,” only gaining widespread notoriety during
the Obama presidency. Campbell and Putnam (2011) and Arceneaux and Nicholson’s (2012)
findings are congruous with Abramowitz’s (2011) assertion that Tea Party supporters are highly
partisan Republicans. Campbell and Putnam (2011) also discover that “past Republican
affiliation is the single strongest predictor of Tea Party support.” Williamson, Skocpol, and
Coggin (2011, 25) write, “the emergence of the Tea Party provided conservative activists with a
new identity funded by Republican business elites and reinforced by a network of conservative
media sources.” Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) find no systematic evidence that the Tea
Party was responsible for the Republican success in 2010, consistent with findings by Jacobson
(2011 and Karpowitz et al. (2011).
Preceding research focuses mainly on the causes of the Tea Party movement, how it
affected the 2010 election and the Republican Party, as well as the general make-up of the
movement. At this time, scholars are just beginning their research about what the elected Tea
Party members have done since assuming office. Research has also yet to fully determine
whether popularly held notions were indeed responsible for the election of TPC members in
2010. This paper examines these questions.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to determine if Tea Party members differ significantly from Establishment
Republicans, this study focuses on the members of the TPC. These members are self-identified,
and this demonstrates an overt and manifested sign that they have endorsed the Tea Party
movement. By compiling a dataset on the 242 members of the House Republican Conference
and looking at the sixty members of the TPC – as seen in Figure 1 – this analysis will measure
legislators ideology, internal party cohesion and intraparty differences, as well as their voting
behavior, districts, and constituencies.
The study will proceed in five parts. The Tea Party will be examined at the elite level
through (1) an examination of roll call voting behavior, (2) by looking at patterns of
endorsements and incumbency, including redistricting. Next, the congressional districts and
constituencies of GOP legislators will be investigated to examine the Tea Party at the mass level.

TPC
60

ER
182

Figure 1: House Republican Caucus in the 112th Congress
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House
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This will be achieved by (3) exploring the districts represented by Republican representatives
through partisan lean, presidential vote, and region, in addition to an examination (4) of
constituency demographic and economic metrics, and mass level opinion.
Previous research provides the basis to form testable hypotheses, and these suppositions
are based on mainly on the results of my undergraduate thesis. Similar to this paper, the thesis
examined TPC members roll call voting and districts – CPVI (partisan lean), unemployment, per
capita income, etc. – during the First Session of the 112th Congress. Concerning roll call voting,
analysis showed that “only [in] three of fifteen (20%) cases did the significance tests show
noteworthy differences between Tea Party Caucus members and their House colleagues on
legislative votes” (Phillips 2012, 30). All three of these votes were economic-minded final
passage votes – the April 2011 federal budget compromise, August 2011 debt ceiling
compromise, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (patent reform). Based on scholarly
research, as well as the findings just described, six hypotheses are tested against the null
hypothesis.
Null hypothesis:
H0: There is no difference between members of the Tea Party Caucus and
Establishment Republicans at the elite level or mass level.
Forty three key votes are examined from the 112th Congress (2011–13); twenty four final
passage votes, and nineteen procedural votes, to understand the MOC’s legislative voting. The
disparity between the two categories occurs because some bills were not subjected a recorded
procedural vote. Key legislative votes were gathered from the Clerk of the House, and (1)
concern policy, (2) were controversial in subject or nature, and (3) were a matter of disagreement
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between the president and Congress. These votes are ripe for study because they were likely to
highlight intra-conference (and partisan) divisions because of the aforementioned criteria.
Procedural votes are examined separately as “They not only involve different public
policies, but also different stages in the legislative process” (Jessee and Theriault 2012, 1). Prior
research (Patty 2005; Theriault 2008; Jessee and Theriault 2012) finds that procedural votes
exhibit more partisan tendencies than the final passage votes on respective pieces of legislation.
In simple terms, a procedural vote is a resolution adopted by the House before a bill that lays out
the rules of debate for that bill, including how much time is allotted for debate, and whether
amendments can be made. Procedural votes showed little variation in previous research.
Votes are further separated into three categories: economic, non-economic, and foreign
policy. Economic votes concern matters that are fiscally oriented (e.g., taxes, annual budget,
etc.). Foreign and security policy votes are those that are primarily oriented toward diplomacy,
foreign, security, or military policy – including the annual National Defense Authorization Act.
Votes that do not fit into either of the previous two categories – including social policy – are
classified as non-economic. Thus, differences are tested among final passage and procedural
votes, and between economic and non-economic key votes. Research by Clausen and Cheney
(1970) finds that party influence is powerful on economic policy in the House. Analysis also
shows that economic context plays a significant role in Tea Party support, at the public level and
in legislative voting and district characteristics (Gervais and Morris 2012; McNitt 2012; Phillips
2012).
Parker (2010) among others writes that the Tea Party movement is often seen as an antiObama faction, furthered not only by opposition to his legislative agenda but also by a personal
dislike of the president due to his background and history. To investigate whether animosity
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toward the president – and by proxy Democrats – affects roll calls, administration support of
legislation is measured. This is accomplished by examining Statements of Administration Policy
(SAP) as released by the Office of Management and Budget, which is a part of the Executive
Office of the President. SAP’s outline the administration’s official position on legislation being
considered by Congress. Less than half of the bills passed by Congress between 1997 and 2004
triggered the release of an SAP (Rice 2010). To account for bills that may not have prompted an
administrative response, presidential support was also measured by analyzing public statements
of support made by the president or vice president, or their designees. Designees include the
White House Press Secretary or their deputy, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid or the Majority
Whip, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi or the Minority Whip. Such support was found
in a number of scenarios where compromises between the executive and legislative branches did
not allow for the timely release of an SAP (i.e., debt ceiling compromises, fiscal cliff, etc.). In
addition, support was only measured for final passage votes, as it is not applicable for procedural
votes.
A MOC may vote yea, nay, or present on each roll call. If a representative does not fall
within those three categories, they are counted as not voting. Furthermore, under House Rule I,
Clause 7, the Speaker is not required to vote except when their vote would break a tie or when
voting is done by ballot (Heitshusen 2011). Speakers retain the prerogative to vote on roll calls,
and they sometimes do on controversial pieces of legislation to send a – often symbolic –
message to their conference.
Elite level hypotheses:
H1: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from
Establishment Republicans when examining final passage votes.
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H2: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from
Establishment Republicans when examining economic votes (vs. non-economic
and foreign policy).
H3: Final passage roll call votes that receive administration support will be
statistically significant.
H4: Tea Party Caucus members will vary at statistically significant levels from
Establishment Republicans when examining patterns of incumbency.
Continuing the study of the Tea Party at the elite level, incumbency is also examined
dating back to 2003. Redistricting that occurred following the 2010 Census is studied by
recording partisan control of the redistricting process at the state level. Endorsements from 2010
are also chronicled. Phillips (2012) found that compared to ER’s, TPC members have a higher
probability of representing safe-southern Republican districts and served in Congress for longer
periods. Endorsements are also logged for the major Tea Party groups.
To examine the Tea Party at the mass level, demographic and geographic information on
districts is documented, and the CPVI of the MOC’s district – which measures district lean – is
noted. The CPVI is calculated by comparing the average vote share for the Democratic and
Republican parties over the last two presidential elections at the national level and district level.
For example, if the national average for the Democratic nominee was 50, and the district mean
was 53, then the district would be D+3. This would be classified as a Weak Democratic leaning
district. Data from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) is also examined to
provide a more complete picture of the constituencies of Republican representatives. The ANES
is a national survey conducted by the University of Michigan and Stanford University before and
after presidential elections. ANES Data will allow for a comparison between districts represented
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by TPC members and ER’s. By aggregating districts, I will be able to examine the Tea Party
movement at the mass level to determine if constituencies account for any differences found
between the TPC and ER’s.
In the seminal work in the field, Miller and Stokes (1963) found that constituency
attitudes and the perceived preferences of the electorate strongly influence the voting behavior of
House members. These findings were subsequently examined and reconfirmed by Cnudde and
McCrone (1966) in their causal model that studied the civil rights dimension, and Erikson (1978,
532) who found that Miller and Stokes (1963) findings may have underestimated the strength of
the relationship between constituency opinions and congressional voting due to measurement
error. I will also test a number of district characteristics to test the validity and reliability of
previous analysis. Full descriptions of the variables, sources, and descriptive statistics are in the
Appendix.
Mass level hypotheses:
H5: The congressional districts of Tea Party Caucus members will vary at
statistically significant levels from Establishment Republicans when examining
their region, partisan lean, and voting patterns.
H6: The districts and constituencies of Tea Party Caucus members are the cause
for observed differences in roll call voting (H2).
The hypotheses will form the basis for answering the main research question that this
study wishes to answer – do members of the TPC differ at statistically significant levels from
their House Republican colleagues? The list of current members of the House of Representatives
and members of the TPC were gathered from the Office of Clerk of the U.S. House of
Representatives (herein after referred to as “The Clerk of the House”), and the TPC’s official
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House page, respectively in September 2011. To examine variables the elite and mass level
variable, TPC membership in the 112th Congress (and in select cases the 113th Congress) is
utilized (Phillips 2012). The data examined will provide sufficient evidence to make clear
predications about the strength and power of the Tea Party movement and its members.
The methodology utilized to conduct this study has its limitations, though the research
and data are sufficient to test to the hypotheses provided. One of these limitations is that this
paper mainly focuses on the self-identified members of the Tea Party movement. Certainly, there
are House Republicans who identify with the movement – even benefited from it – but have not
taken the additional step of joining the TPC. A second limitation is attempting to understand the
meaning of a “no” vote by a member. There are a number of reasons that a member may vote
nay, including but not limited to, disagreement with the principle of a bill, the legislation may
not be conservative enough for their support, or the bill may already have sufficient votes for
passage.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE TEA PARTY CAUCUS
The statistical analysis for this chapter was conducted with SPSS software. For this
section – in which the elite level is scrutinized – the variables are analyzed in two distinct phases.
First roll call voting is examined in three phases; votes that concern economic policy, noneconomic policy, and foreign and security policy. Analysis of the legislative key votes is
completed via a means comparison and the creation of an additive index. Presidential support of
legislation is also investigated. A summary of the analysis and examination of significance then
follows. Second, MOC’s elite level district characteristics are examined, including 2010
endorsements, incumbency, and 2012 redistricting. Chapter Five examines in detail the districts
that members represent. To conclude, significance testing is completed with binary logistic
regression for roll call voting and linear regression for other variables.

Economic Votes

As seen in previous research (Phillips 2012), votes that concern economic policy are
more likely to show statistically significant differences between the TPC and Establishment
Republicans. The analysis of roll call voting has been broken into areas, one that deals
exclusively with procedural votes, and the second that discusses final passage votes. This has
been done in order to assess the two areas separately, to show differences in voting tendencies,
and to conclude whether there is evidence that rules votes are more partisan as literature suggests
(Theriault 2008).
Table 1 shows significant differences in economic votes. Of the ten final passage votes
examined, eight show statistical significance at or below the .10 level between the groups.
22

Table 1: Significance Tests of Economic Roll Call Votes
Session Variable
Coefficient
April 2011 Federal Budget Compromise – Final Passage o
-.894***
Cut, Cap and Balance – Procedural
.859
Cut, Cap and Balance – Final Passage
.624
1
August 2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise– Final Passage o
-1.035***
Leahy Smith Patent Reform – Procedural
.379
o
Leahy Smith Patent Reform – Final Passage
-.758**
Paul Ryan Budget FY 2012 – Final Passage
-.011
o
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 – Final Passage
-1.021***
Paul Ryan Budget FY 2013 – Final Passage
-.558
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act – Procedural
-1.169*
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act – Final Passage o
-.924***
2
2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution – Procedural
-.441
2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution – Final Passage o
-.865***
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – Procedural
1.233
o
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – Final Passage
-1.402***
Economic Procedural Votes Additive Index
.054
Economic Final Passage Votes Additive Index
-.282***

SE
.319
1.080
.784
.314
.659
.310
.830
.305
.579
.651
.329
.631
.308
1.060
.392
.056
.146

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
o
Administration support of legislation

The only economic votes that did not exhibit significant variance were the two Paul Ryan
budgets and the Cut, Cap and Balance plan (2.2, 3.4, and 0.6 percentage points respectively).
Four of the most significant final passage roll call votes – the April 2011 Federal Budget
Compromise, the August 2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 (Payroll Tax Cut), and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Fiscal
Cliff compromise) – are seen in Table 2. Procedural votes for the April 2011 Federal Budget
compromise, August 2011 Debt Ceiling compromise, Paul Ryan Fiscal Year 2012 budget, and
the Paul Ryan Fiscal Year 2013 budget were not analyzed in the significance table because they
did not display levels of variation great enough for analysis with binary logistic regression.
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Table 2: Means Comparison of Selected Significant Economic Roll Call Votes

Yea
Nay
Not
Voting
NonMember
Total

2011 BUDGET COMPR***
a
TPC
ER
DIF
60.0%
78.6%
-18.6%
(36)
(143)
38.3%
19.2%
+19.1%
(23)
(35)
1.7%
1.1%
+0.6%
(1)
(2)
0.0%
1.1%
-1.1%
(0)
(2)
100.0%
100.0%
(60)
(182)

2011 DEBT CEILING***
a
TPC
ER
DIF
55.0%
77.5%
-22.5%
(33)
(141)
45.0%
21.4%
+23.6%
(27)
(39)
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
(0)
(0)
0.0%
1.1%
-1.1%
(0)
(2)
100.0%
100.0%
(60)
(182)

2012 PAYROLL TAX CUT***
a
TPC
ER
DIF
41.7%
66.5%
-24.8%
(25)
(121)
58.3%
30.8%
+27.5%
(35)
(14)
0.0%
2.7%
-2.7%
(0)
(5)
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
(0)
(0)
100.0%
100.0%
(60)
(182)

2013 FISCAL CLIFF***
a
TPC
ER
DIF
15.0%
41.8%
-26.8%
(9)
(76)
83.3%
54.9%
+28.4%
(50)
(100)
1.7%
2.2%
-0.5%
(1)
(4)
0.0%
1.1%
-1.1%
(0)
(2)
100.0%
100.0%
(60)
(182)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Included are four significant final passage economic
votes that received presidential support. The Speaker of the House may vote on roll calls but is only required to cast a vote in limited
circumstances (Heitshusen 2011).
a
Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Seven votes show differences of greater than 15 percentage points between the two groups on
yea voting. The table illustrates the stark differences between the groups on final passage votes.
Procedural votes do not show the same tendency, as all nine were within 2.3 percentage
points. The average variance between TPC and ER yea voting was .83 percentage points on
procedural votes, and 15.72 percentage points on final passage votes. The greatest discrepancy
was 27.9 percentage points on the final passage vote for the fiscal cliff compromise. For
procedural votes, the largest divergence was 2.3 percentage points on patent reform. Three of the
procedural votes showed no difference between the two groups. In addition, there were three
votes where TPC members were more likely than ER’s to vote yea, the procedural votes for the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (patent reform), and the FY 2012 and FY 2013 Ryan budget.
Seven votes – all significant – received administration support, having an average difference of
21.57 percentage points between the two groups. The smallest was 16.7 and the largest was 27.9
percentage points. These results appear congruous with earlier research that finds animosity
toward Obama is a key-driving factor in Tea Party support (Jacobson 2011; Maxwell and Parent
2012). However, it is unknown precisely how administration support affected Tea Party support
on key pieces of legislation. Particularly, how did support influence voting on roll calls that
MOC’s would have supported otherwise. The topic of how administration support specifically
affected these votes requires further study.
The final segment of this analysis was completed by creating an additive index of
economic votes, and assigned a score of one for each if the MOC voted in the affirmative. This
provided maximum scores of ten for final passage votes and nine procedural votes. Members
who did not vote or voted present were included with those who voted in the negative (nay).
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Table 3: Additive Index Means Comparison of Economic Roll Call Votes
Variable
Final Passagea
Procedural Votesa

TPC
6.30
8.77

ER
7.78
8.66

DIFb
-1.48***
+.11

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Additive Index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is ten for final passage and nine for
procedural.
b
Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
a

Research by Cohen and Noll (1991) found that roll call abstentions can be a deliberate voting
tactic, the same as yea and nay voting. The procedural vote for the Middle Class Tax Relief and
Job Creation Act of 2012 was not included in the analysis because it was agreed to by voice vote.
The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 3, and shows a high-level of variance on final
passage votes but not procedural votes between the groups. Table 1 showed that the final passage
votes additive index was significant at the .01 level. On final passage, 62.1% of ER’s voted for at
least eight of the bills. The TPC varied widely, with only 38.4% voting for at least eight of the
bills. Contrary to these results, over 80% of both the TPC and ER’s voted for all nine of the
procedural votes. These findings are in agreement with Patty (2005) and Theriault (2008), who
found that procedural votes show greater party cohesion than final passage votes.
An explanation of the significance variance seen in economic votes is complex. In 2010 –
when the TPM helped to propel the Republican surge – economic issues were vital as the United
States continued to suffer from the effects of ‘The Great Recession.’ Rae (2011, 6-8) compares
the TPM with other “populist movements in US political history […] that [… were] particularly
prevalent during times of severe economic distress.” Rae (2011) also notes the economic issues
were essential to the rise of the TPM. It is also widely thought that TPC members view economic
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legislation as their main priority, and that economic conservatism is one of if not the most
important facets of the movement.
District level variables play a large role in economic voting. Conservative economic
voting can be explained by observing that the majority of TPC members (55%) represented safesouthern Republican districts (Phillips 2012). This pattern, along with the greater conservatism
evident in the south, allows TPC members more flexibility in voting. Madestam et al. (2012, 44)
find that “representatives responded to large [Tea Party] protests in their district by voting more
conservatively in Congress.” Concerned with the electoral consequences of their voting, MOC’s
reflect their districts views in their roll call voting to increase their chances of reelection – by
enhancing their policy ‘fit’ with the district – and it also allows the member to increase their
visibility on high-profile legislation (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989). Due to the economic
conditions of the country during the 112th Congress, economic issues were likely to gain public
attention, and thus were the most visible and important statement a MOC could make.

Non-Economic Votes

The second portion of this analysis focuses on non-economic key votes, including a
number of bills that may appear economic in nature, but are not fiscally oriented. Non-economic
votes do not show a high-level of variance similar to that of the previously examined economic
votes. As observed in Table 4, which provides a breakdown of the non-economic votes analyzed,
none of the roll calls were statistically significant – though the reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act was on the cusp (0.110).
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The greatest difference on any of the votes was five percentage points on the final
passage vote for the D.C. abortion ban. Among procedural votes, it was 2.8 percentage points on
the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The average difference between TPC
and ER yea voting was .67 percentage points on procedural votes, and 1.91 percentage points on
final passage votes. On six of the fifteen roll calls, TPC members were more likely than ER’s to
vote yea. These final passage votes included the legislation to prohibit further funding of NPR,
the Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act, the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women
Act, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business
Creation Act, and the D.C. abortion ban. Seven votes showed no variance between the TPC and
ER’s, four procedural and three final passage votes. Once again, procedural votes show a greater
amount of partisan cohesion than final passage votes. No votes received administration support.

Table 4: Significance Tests of Non-Economic Roll Call Votes
Session Variable
Coefficient
No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act – Procedural
.522
No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act – Final Passage
.859
1
Prohibit NPR funding – Final Passage
1.513
Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act – Procedural
-.441
Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act – Procedural
-.011
Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act – Final Passage
1.427
Violence Against Women Act – Procedural
-1.156
Violence Against Women Act – Final Passage
.105
2
Repeal of Obamacare Act – Procedural
-.428
Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act – Final Passage
-.274
DC Abortion Ban – Final Passage
.112
Non-Economic Procedural Votes Additive Index
-.014
Non-Economic Final Passage Votes Additive Index
.086
Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
o
Administration support of legislation
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SE
.789
1.080
1.049
.631
.830
1.052
.724
.491
.879
.707
.413
.039
.061

Table 5: Additive Index Means Comparison of Non-Economic Roll Call Votes
Variable
Final Passagea
Procedural Votesa

TPC
5.77
8.65

ER
5.79
8.46

DIFb
-.02
+.19

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Additive index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is nine for final passage and six for
procedural.
b
Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
a

The procedural votes for the defunding of NPR, and the final passage votes for Repealing the
Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, Repeal of Obamacare Act, and the Federal Reserve
Transparency Act of 2012 were not analyzed in the significance table because they did not
display levels of variation great enough for analysis with binary logistic regression.
Similar to the previous section, an additive index was used to further examine the votes.
The maximum possible score was nine for the final passage votes and six for the procedural
votes, which could be reached if the MOC voted in the affirmative for each vote. The results of
this analysis can be seen in Table 5. Neither group shows a high-level of variance with 90% of
MOC’s voting in the affirmative for either eight or nine of the final passage votes. This is a
direct contradiction to the results seen when examining economic votes, where only 40.9% of
MOC’s voted for at least of nine of the ten votes. 83.1% of members voted for all six procedural
votes, 2.5 percentage points higher than in the economic votes category. The TPC was slightly
more likely to support non-economic legislation on final passage, and slightly less likely to
support it on procedural votes. Procedural votes for the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business
Creation Act, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act, and the D.C. abortion ban were not
analyzed because they were not subject to roll call votes.
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A number of factors contribute to non-economic votes showing less variance. The fifteen
votes examined concerned topics that are widely popular amongst Republicans or in general –
repeal of the Affordable Care Act, reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, halting
new government regulation, and auditing the Federal Reserve. None of these votes likely would
have attained the national media exposure that the economic votes would have garnered, nor are
they considered important planks of the Tea Party agenda – with the exception of the repeal
Affordable Care Act that was both politically important and gained vast media exposure.

Foreign and Security Policy Votes

Roll call votes whose main focusing point is foreign and/or security policy are examined
next in this section. Nine foreign policy votes were analyzed, spanning from the authorization of
limited use of military force in Libya to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2013. As stated previously, these votes are primarily oriented toward diplomacy, foreign,
security, or military policy. The smallest of the three groups of legislative votes examined, these
votes required further analysis due to the popular notion that “politics stops at the waters edge”
(McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1077). In our current partisan political atmosphere, it is
important to determine if TPC members vote differently on foreign policy than domestic policy.
Due to the country’s constitutional structure, the president as commander-in-chief and
head of state has jurisdiction over a wide ranging number of issues, and great power and
influence over many others. Foreign policy votes take on particular importance because the
foreign and security arena belongs largely to the president and these issues are typically wellknown by the electorate and covered by the media (Libya, Egypt, Syria, etc.). Due to research
30

(Parker 2010; Suskind 2011) that finds animosity toward the president is a motivating factor in
Tea Party membership at the mass level, it is necessary to see if this distrust – and even contempt
– for the president spills over in the elite level on such high-profile presidential issues.
As seen in Table 6, no significant differences are seen in foreign policy votes when
conducting significance tests. Examining the means comparison of the five final passage votes
and four procedural votes, none show differences of greater than five percentage points. The
average discrepancy between TPC and ER yea voting was .975 percentage points on procedural
votes, and 2.24 percentage points on final passage votes. The National Defense Authorization
Act of 2012 had the biggest difference amongst final passage votes at 4.1 percentage points, and
the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2012 had the largest difference among procedural
votes at 1.7 percentage points. On five of the nine roll calls, TPC members were more likely than
ER’s to vote yea. Three votes garnered administration support, and none were significant.

Table 6: Significance Tests of Foreign and Security Policy Roll Call Votes
Session Variable
Authorizing Limited Use of Force in Libya – Procedural
Authorizing Limited Use of Force in Libya – Final Passage
1
PATRIOT Extension Act of 2011 – Final Passage o
National Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 – Procedural
National Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 – Final Passage o
FISA Reauthorization Act of 2012 – Procedural
2
FISA Reauthorization Act of 2012 – Final Passage o
National Defense Authorization Act FY 2013 – Procedural
National Defense Authorization Act FY 2013 – Final Passage
Foreign Policy Procedural Votes Additive Index
Foreign Policy Final Passage Votes Additive Index

Coefficient
.882
-.859
.209
.288
-.143
.294
-.105
1.233
-.298
.082
-.026

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
o
Administration support of legislation
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SE
.771
1.080
.393
.805
.356
.663
.604
1.060
.395
.037
.066

With the lone exception of the bill limiting the U.S. military role in Libya, all of the votes
were supported to some extent by the president. McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) found that in
the post-Cold War era partisanship is central to executive-legislative relations in the foreign
policy arena. However, McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) focus on differences between the
Democratic and Republican parties, whereas this analysis concentrates on intraparty differences.
No major differences are seen at the intraparty level between the TPC and ER’s, as seen in Table
7. The case may still be that Congress is more likely to defer foreign policy – even in a
hyperpartisan environment – to a commander-in-chief seen as strong in the arena, particularly in
Obama’s case following the raid that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Even
though foreign policy votes are visible and often high profile, they may not be as important to
constituents as domestic policy votes, particularly those concerning the economy during a
recovery. As such, intraparty differences may not be as inherent in the foreign policy arena.
As done previously, to further analyze the votes an additive index was created. The
maximum score was five for the final passage votes, and four for the procedural votes, which
could be attained if the MOC voted in the affirmative for each vote. The table shows little
variance amongst procedural votes. Minimal differences are seen amongst final passage votes.

Table 7: Additive Index Means Comparison of Foreign and Security Policy Roll Call Votes
Variable
Final Passagea
Procedural Votesa

TPC
3.37
3.87

ER
3.43
3.76

DIFb
-.06
+.11

Note: Independent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Additive index measures number of yea votes, maximum value is five for final passage and four for
procedural.
b
Difference between TPC members and Establishment Republicans.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
a
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64.1% of ER’s voted for at least four of the five pieces of legislation, compared to 58.4% of the
TPC. This is in comparison to over 83% of MOC’s who voted for all four of the procedural
votes. TPC members were more likely than their colleagues to support the procedural votes.
However, TPC members were marginally less likely to support the final passage votes. The
procedural vote for the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 was not included in the
analysis because it was “ordered without objection” by voice vote.

Endorsements

Over two-hundred Republican candidates were endorsed during the 2010 midterm
election cycle by at least one of the major Tea Party groups (Bailey, Mummolo and Noel 2011).
Three major political groups were studied in this paper due to their endorsement activities during
the 2010 election cycle, FreedomWorks, the Tea Party Express, and former Alaska Governor,
political pundit, and 2008 GOP Vice Presidential Nominee Sarah Palin. There were 173 total
endorsements made by the three main Tea Party organizations during the 2010 election.

Table 8: 2010 Endorsements Overview by Organization

Endorsed
Not-Endorsed
Total

FreedomWorks
TPC
ER
TOT
21.7%
31.6%
29.2%
(13)
(57)
(70)
78.3%
68.3%
70.8%
(47)
(123)
(170)
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(60)
(180)
(240)

TPC
10.0%
(6)
90.0%
(54)
100.0%
(60)

Sarah Palin
ER
TOT
7.2%
7.9%
(13)
(19)
92.7%
92.1%
(167)
(221)
100.0% 100.0%
(180)
(240)

Tea Party Express
TPC
ER
TOT
25.0%
38.3%
35.0%
(15)
(69)
(84)
75.0%
61.6%
65%
(45)
(111)
(156)
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(60)
(180)
(240)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present
in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective
organizations.
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There were 84 by the Tea Party Express, 70 by FreedomWorks, and 19 from Sarah Palin. As
seen in Table 8, only 34 of those endorsements were made to candidates who joined the TPC,
only 19.7% of total endorsements. Two House Republicans won special elections on September
13, 2011 – Mark Amodei and Robert Turner. Amodei represents Nevada’s 2nd District, replacing
Dean Heller who was appointed to the United States Senate to replace John Ensign. Turner
represents New York’s 9th District, and succeeded Anthony Weiner following his resignation
from Congress. The Tea Party Express had endorsed Heller during his 2010 reelection campaign.
As can be seen in Table 9, the groups’ endorsements varied widely. Both incumbents and
challengers were endorsed. The table shows that the almost seventy percent of the total
endorsements were given to freshmen. The Tea Party Express is an anomaly in the groups as it
gave forty-nine endorsements to incumbents and only 35 to freshmen. FreedomWorks awarded
all but one of its 70 endorsements to freshmen – Tom Graves from Georgia’s 9th District was the
lone exception. Sarah Palin endorsed 17 freshmen and only two incumbents. TPC freshmen
received 22 total endorsements, 18.2% of total freshmen endorsements. FreedomWorks endorsed
thirteen TPC freshmen, Palin endorsed five, and the Tea Party Express endorsed four.

Table 9: 2010 Endorsements Overview by Incumbency
Freshmen
Incumbents
Total

FreedomWorks
98.6%
(69)
1.4%
(1)
100.0%
(70)

Sarah Palin
89.5%
(17)
10.5%
(2)
100.0%
(19)

Tea Party Express
41.7%
(35)
58.3%
(49)
100.0%
(84)

Total
69.9%
(121)
30.1%
(52)
100.0%
(173)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present
in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective
organizations.
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Table 10: Significance Tests of Endorsements
Variable
FreedomWorks
Sarah Palin
Tea Party Express

Coefficient
-.095
.045
-.121*

SE
.061
.104
.058

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from the Washington Post and the respective
organizations.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Examined individually, only Tea Party Express endorsements are significant (.061), as
seen in Table 10. With these results, the data shows that endorsements as a whole had little effect
on members subsequently joining the TPC. This raises the question of whether the candidate’s
affiliation with the Tea Party was solely for electoral or financial reasons in 2010. These results
are consistent with the findings by Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011) who note that not only do
the three groups weakly correlate with each other but also that the endorsements meant little for
later TPC membership.

Incumbency

In 2010, eighty-seven GOP freshmen were elected to the House. Incumbency is an
important factor to be examined because many researchers have characterized the Tea Party as
an insurgent force, a notion suggested by the large number of elected freshmen. Rae (2011, 19)
characterized the Tea Party movement as “insurgent, spontaneous, and relatively unstructured.”
Analyzing incumbency data dating back to 2002 election and the 108th Congress (2003–
05) – gathered from The Clerk of the House as well as the Cook Political Report, it can be
determined that members of the TPC have a higher likelihood of being an incumbent than ER’s.
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Figure 2: 112th Congress, Membership Incumbency in Previous Congressional Terms
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of The House and The
Cook Political Report
Figure 2 shows the percent of members from the 112th Congress serving in the respective
congressional terms. TPC members are above both the ER and overall averages. In the 111th and
110th Congresses, the difference between the TPC and ER is 10%. Even dating back to the
redistricting that took place before the 2002 midterm elections, TPC members still exhibit higher
incumbency rates in the 108th Congress, 43.3% to 41.8%. These results show that a majority of
the TPC was on the ballot during the November 2004 general election, in which Bush won
reelection and the GOP gained three seats in the House and four in the Senate.
The 108th Congress is the first congress examined where a majority of those who joined the TPC
in the 112th Congress were not incumbents.
These results shatter the notion that the Tea Party – at least at the elite level – is an
insurgent, grassroots movement, as more than half of TPC members were serving in Congress in
2005. Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011, 8) wrote that the members who eventually joined the
TPC “were responding to the Tea Party; they were not spawned by it.” Jacobson (2011) partially
explains this pattern by noting that Tea Party conferred a label on those who already held
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conservative Republicans views on economic and social issues. Incumbent Representatives also
perform markedly better in reelection campaigns, and incumbents were likely to want to
capitalize on the popular momentum of the Tea Party movement – either nationally or within
their safe districts (Mayhew 1974; Friedman and Holden 2009). This information coupled with
the data concerning district characteristics explains the higher rate of incumbency.
Another incumbency characteristic in need of evaluation is that of the freshmen in the
112th Congress. Were their elections the result of the unique forces at play in 2010? In addition,
could these TPC members be reelected again in an election headlined by the reelection of an
incumbent Democratic president. Table 11 presents the analysis of these members.
Representatives who were reelected are designated as ‘members,’ whereas those who are no
longer serving in Congress are labeled as ‘non-members.’ Non-members may have chosen to not
seek reelection, or they were not reelected in 2012. About 82% of the House GOP – 199 out of
242 members – was reelected to the 113th Congress. Out of the sixty TPC members in the last
Congress, forty-nine were reelected. Two reelected members – Mike Coffman (CO-6) and
Edward Royce (CA-39) – decided against rejoining the caucus. The analysis shows that both
freshmen and incumbents were reelected to the 113th Congress at roughly the same rate (82%).
Table 11: 112th Congress, 2012 Reelection Overview by Incumbency

113th Member
113th Non-Member
Total

TPC
Freshmen Incumbent
76.5%
83.7%
(13)
(36)
23.5%
16.3%
(4)
(7)
100.0%
100.0%
(17)
(43)

Freshmen
82.9%
(58)
17.1%
(12)
100.0%
(70)

ER
Incumbent
82.1%
(92)
17.9%
(20)
100.0%
(112)

TOTAL
Freshmen Incumbent
81.6%
82.6%
(71)
(128)
18.4%
17.4%
(16)
(27)
100.0%
100.0%
(87)
(155)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House.
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Table 12: Significance Tests of Incumbency
Variable
111th Congress Incumbency
110th Congress Incumbency
109th Congress Incumbency
108th Congress Incumbency

Coefficient
.091
.083
.005
.014

SE
.058
.056
.056
.056

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and The Cook Political
Report.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

However, TPC freshmen were reelected at a slightly lower rate – about 6.5% less – than
Establishment Republicans. Table 12 shows the significance test results for the incumbency
variables. Based on these findings, hypothesis three is not supported, as none of the variables
reach the level of statistical significance. However, Phillips (2012) conclusion that TPC members
would be largely successful in gaining reelection in 2012 is proven correct. Of the 87 Republican
freshmen elected to the 112th Congress, 71 were reelected

Redistricting and the 2012 Election

Examining incumbency gains added importance because of the redistricting that occurred
following the 2010 Census. As explained earlier, a variable is used to control for redistricting,
which is completed by examining which political party controlled the state legislature during the
period following the Census, and preceding the 2012 election – when redistricting would have
occurred. This variable has two components, which party controlled the state legislature and
which party controlled the governorship. For example, if Democrats controlled the legislature but
the state had a Republican governor, the state would be coded as under ‘split control.’
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Figure 3: 113th Congress, Party Control of Redistricting Process
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and The
National Conference of State Legislatures

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2011), eleven states use nonpartisan
commissions to conduct the redistricting process. However, these commissions are often
nonpartisan in name only – as the majority are staffed by partisan political appointees.
Upon further examination, differences emerge when controlling for redistricting.
However, these differences are what would be expected given the circumstances. Figure 3 shows
that reelected members are much more likely to emanate from states where the process was
controlled by Republicans. On the other hand, 56% of those no longer in Congress emanated
from states where the process was controlled by Democrats or split between the parties. In total,
about 57.4% of members originated from states with Republican control, 23.6% split control,
17.8% Democratic control, and 1.2% nonpartisan (Nebraska).
Redistricting was found to not be statistically significant with a p-value of .225.
Interestingly, 63.4% of freshmen in the 112th Congress who were reelected in 2012 came from
states where the GOP controlled the redistricting process. This was marginally better than the
58.6% of incumbents in similar circumstances. 69.2% of TPC freshmen that were reelected were
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from areas with Republican controlled redistricting (ER’s 62.1%). 72.2% of TPC incumbents in
the 112th Congress that were reelected were from areas with GOP controlled redistricting
compared to 53.3% of ER’s.
Even though TPC members were statistically just as likely to attain reelection as ER’s in
2012, they were more likely to represent districts in states where their own party controlled the
process of redistricting, 68.3% of the TPC to 53.8% of ER’s. These findings are consistent with
Phillips (2012) discovery that a majority of TPC members represent safe-southern Republican
districts. These districts are more likely to be in states where the GOP controlled the redistricting
process following the 2010 Census, and thus aided to some extent members of the same party. A
more in-depth analysis of redistricting, one providing a fuller examination of the nonpartisan
commissions for example unfortunately could not be completed within the time provided to
complete this study.
Partisan control of the redistricting process plays a key role by not only affecting chances
of electoral success at the ballot box in November, but also in the decision by the MOC to seek
reelection. Some members, sensing electoral vulnerability – including susceptibility based upon
redistricting – may choose to retire rather than risk electoral defeat in a process known as
strategic retirement (Moore and Hibbing 1998; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). This process may
have played a larger role in 2012 than 2010. In 2010, the GOP was riding a surge of momentum
on the back of the Tea Party. In 2012, MOC’s not only had to deal with the repercussions of
redistricting but also an election headlined by the reelection of a Democratic president. However,
only nineteen Republicans retired rather than seeking reelection in 2012, compared to twenty in
2010. Democrats only gained one of these seats in 2012, California’s 26th district. The GOP had
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a net loss of six seats in 2012, dropping their majority to 234 (the GOP had only 240 sitting
members at the conclusion of the 112th Congress).

Elite Level Analysis Summary

At the elite level, significant differences are seen in terms of economic final passage
votes. While exhibiting interesting differences using means comparison, non-economic votes,
and foreign and security policy votes, as well as endorsements, incumbency, and redistricting
were not found to be statistically significant. These results show that TPC members vote
markedly more conservative on economic matters than their GOP colleagues. These differences
are found largely on highly publicized and controversial final passage votes, such as Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
Whether these voting patterns are the result of elite polarization or constituency influence as
exhibited in Miller and Stokes (1963) causal model of representation is analyzed in the study of
the Tea Party movement at the mass level in the next chapter. Conclusions follow in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT
Is the Tea Party really a grassroots movement? Moreover, if so, are its representatives in
Congress a product of the movement at the mass level or of elite manipulation. As noted in the
analysis, Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2011, 37) concluded that the Tea Party movement is more
representative of elites than “the will of the people” because TPC members are responding to
elite interests and not constituency preferences. Based on like opinions and popular notions, the
connection between the Tea Party movement at the elite and mass levels takes on added
importance. Was the movement started at the mass or elite level, how do the two levels differ,
and did Tea Party movement drag the GOP further to the right, or did a party already becoming
increasingly conservative spur the Tea Party movement. These questions are imperative to
answer, though the latter while important falls outside the scope of this study.
Whereas in the previous chapter the TPC is examined, in this chapter the districts and
constituencies of Republican House members is explored by examining data from the United
States Census Bureau, American Community Survey, and the American National Election Study
(ANES) from 2012. In this chapter, the variables are again analyzed in multiple phases. First, the
districts of TPC members are examined, including presidential voting, district lean, and region.
Second, TPC constituencies are investigated through an examination of demographics. Third, an
analysis of mass level opinion is completed via data from the ANES. Significance testing is
completed using linear regression, or binary logistic regression when appropriate. When coupled,
Chapters 4 and 5 provide a fuller analysis of the Tea Party movement by showing the movement
at the both the elite and mass levels.
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Districts: Geography and Voting

While examining endorsements, incumbency and legislative voting records at the elite
level paints a wide picture of any MOC, analyzing the district that they represent helps to
illustrate not only their constituency but also the forces that helped send them to Congress and
that continue to shape their voting records. In this section, I examine information pertaining
specifically to the districts that MOC’s represent. Variables analyzed include, the Cook Partisan
Voting Index (CPVI), census region, and district presidential vote. These variables differ from
those scrutinized in the next section because they deal more with the districts as a whole, not
with the constituents of the district. Though, there is room for debate.
First to be examined is CPVI. The Cook Political Report is responsible for the CPVI,
which measures how strongly a congressional district leans to the Democratic or Republican
Party. This is accomplished by comparing the district's average party share of the presidential
vote in the past two presidential elections to the nation's average. Table 13 shows the CPVI for
the 112th (all members ) and 113th Congresses (reelected members). The overwhelmingly safe
nature of the districts that TPC members represent is an important finding. In the 112th
Congress, no TPC members represented Democratic leaning districts, and only ER represented a
Weak Democratic. TPC members are largely represent reliably safe GOP districts. Exploring the
112th Congress, Fifty-five percent of the TPC represents strong Republican districts, compared to
35% of ER’s. While 38% of ER’s hail from swing or weak Democratic districts, only 8.3% of
TPC members represent swing districts (none represent Democratic districts). TPC members are
nearly 20 percentage points more likely to represent strong Republican districts, and 30
percentage points less likely to represent swing or Democratic leaning districts.
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Table 13: Cook Partisan Voting Index Overview by Congress
TPC
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Swing
Weak Democratic
Strong Democratic
Total

112th
55.0%
(33)
36.7%
(22)
8.3%
(5)
0.0%
(0)
0.0%
(0)
100.0%
(60)

ER
113th
72.3%
(34)
17.1%
(8)
10.6%
(5)
0.0%
(0)
0.0%
(0)
100.0%
(47)

112th
35.2%
(64)
26.4%
(48)
37.9%
(69)
0.5%
(1)
0.0%
(0)
100.0%
(182)

113th
44.1%
(67)
25.0%
(38)
30.9%
(47)
0.0%
(0)
0.0%
(0)
100.0%
(152)

TOTAL
112th
113th
40.1%
50.8%
(97)
(101)
28.9%
23.1%
(70)
(46)
30.6%
26.1%
(74)
(52)
0.4%
0.0%
(1)
(0)
0.0%
0.0%
(0)
(0)
100.0%
100.0%
(242)
(199)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th and 113th Congresses. The table
only analyzes sitting Members of Congress who served in the 112th Congress. Those not reelected were
coded as missing.
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and
The Cook Political Report.

Freshmen Members of Congress were more likely to represent Democratic and swing districts.
Examining the 113th Congress, 72.3% of TPC members are from Safe Republican districts,
compared to 44.1% of ER’s. The differences seen in the 112th Congress are exacerbated in the
113th Congress – with the percentage point difference increasing by nearly fifty percent.
However, more members are likely to represent Swing or Democratic leaning districts, 10.6% of
TPC members and 30.9% of ER’s.
The main difference seen between the two terms is there are no currently serving
members from districts that lean Democratic, and that a higher proportion of the members
represent safe Republican districts. These results are partially to be expected, as one of the
reasons for the GOP surge in 2010 was that the GOP overextended into a number of swing and
Democratic leaning districts (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2011). Research shows that
gerrymandering and redistricting are a potent political force. The results are also important
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because they show that the GOP is likely to retain the House for the near future – barring another
Democratic wave election like 2006 in which they overextended into Republican districts (Bond,
Fleisher, and Ilderton 2011).
Second to be studied is presidential vote broken down by district. Presidential vote is
analyzed in this section because of its connection with the CPVI. Examining how the districts
voted in the past three presidential elections, it is seen that TPC members, following the previous
finding of the group representing safe Republican districts, did vote for the Democratic candidate
at a substantially lower rate than the districts of ER’s. Allen West, from Florida’s 22nd District,
was the only TPC member who represented a district carried by both John Kerry and Barack
Obama in 2004 and 2008, respectively. West was not reelected in 2012, though he did seek
election in a more Republican district. As seen in Figure 4, in both elections there was marked
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difference between the two groups, 6 percentage points in 2004, 26 in 2008, and 5 in 2012.
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Figure 4: District Presidential Vote by Election and Group
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House and the
Cook Political Report
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In 2008, only three districts represented by a TPC member voted for Obama. In 2012, that
number was only one. When the percentages of the three elections are averaged, 97.1% of
districts represented by TPC members did not vote for the Democratic candidate, compared to
83.7% of ER districts.
In 2008, 64.4% of districts represented by freshmen in the 112th Congress did not vote for
Obama, compared to 81.3% of incumbents. In 2004, 87.4% of freshmen districts did not vote for
Kerry, compared to 97.4% of their incumbent colleagues. In 2012, 91.5% of districts represented
by freshmen in the 112th Congress did not vote for Obama, compared to 92.2% of incumbents.
Districts represented by members of the TPC had even starker contrasts. 82.4% of districts
represented by freshmen TPC members voted the Republican nominee in 2008, while all 43
districts represented by incumbent TPC members voted against the Democratic candidate. In
2004, 94.1% of districts represented by freshmen TPC members voted against the Democratic
candidate, compared again to all 43 districts represented by their incumbent colleagues. In 2012,
all thirteen TPC districts represented by freshmen in 112th Congress voted for the GOP nominee,
along with 97.1 of TPC incumbent districts. In 2004 and 2008, neither Democratic nominee won
a district represented by a TPC member who was also a member of the 111th Congress. Obama
only won one such district in 2012. Though the numbers provide similar information, analyzing
the CPVI and presidential vote of MOC’s districts provide further evidence of the safe
Republican nature of TPC districts.
Third to be explored is the geographic background of the districts represented by MOC’s
– census region. As seen in Table 14, TPC members overwhelmingly represent districts in the
South. They also represented the other regions of the country at lower rates than their colleagues.
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Table 14: Census Region Overview by Group
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Total

TPC
0.0%
(0)
20.0%
(12)
63.3%
(38)
16.7%
(10)
100.0%
(60)

ER
15.4%
(28)
28.6%
(52)
36.8%
(67)
19.2%
(35)
100.0%
(182)

Total
11.6%
(28)
26.4%
(64)
43.4%
(105)
18.6%
(45)
100.0%
(242)

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. Two members present
in the dataset did not run in the 2010 general elections.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and the United States
Census Bureau.

None represent districts in the Northeast. Almost two-thirds of TPC members represent southern
districts, while only 37% of ER’s do. Jacobson (2011, 15) found that “The media image of the
Tea Partiers is generally on target: people who are… from the South.” 16.1% of freshmen
MOC’s represent districts in the Northeast, 29.9% from the Midwest, 39.1% in the South and
14.9% from the West. Nine percent of GOP incumbent members represent northeastern districts,
24.5% from the Midwest, 45.8% from the South and 20.6% from the West. Wider differences are
seen when examining the TPC. 70.6% of TPC freshmen represent southern districts, while
23.5% are from districts in the Midwest, and only 5.9% represent districts in the West.
Incumbent TPC members are less likely to represent southern districts with only 60.5% doing so,
while 18.6% represent districts in the Midwest, and 20.9% are from the West.
Analogous with the previous chapter on the elite level, significance tests are completed to
determine if there is interaction between the variables. As seen in Table 15, all of the district
variables were found to be statistically significant, with four falling at or below the .01 level.
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Table 15: Significance Tests of Congressional Districts
Variable
Congressional District 2012 Presidential Vote+
Congressional District 2008 Presidential Vote
Congressional District 2004 Presidential Vote
Cook Partisan Voting Index – 113th Congress+
Cook Partisan Voting Index – 112th Congress
Census region

Coefficient
-.121*
-.263***
-.108*
-.245***
-.258***
.176***

SE
.110
.062
.115
.035
.032
.030

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress. +TPC membership in
the 113th Congress is used as dependent variable.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and The Cook Political
Report.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

These variables highlight the unique circumstances at play in both the 2008 and 2010 elections.
In the former, an economic downtown not seen since the Great Depression, a deeply unpopular
president, and an exceptional campaigner combined for the election of the first AfricanAmerican President of the United States. In the latter, the same economic forces, an intensely
disliked overhaul of the nation’s health care system, and a new political movement joined for the
biggest seat gain in generations.
Downs (1957) posited that due to electoral competition, electoral districts would be
represented by a representative near to district’s median voter; therefore conservative roll call
voting is begot by conservative districts and voters. These results illustrate that the districts
themselves seemingly account for the roll call voting behavior of the MOC, including the more
conservative economic voting of TPC members. Representing overwhelmingly safe southern
GOP districts that voted for the Republican nominee in each of the past three presidential
elections, TPC members have a tremendous amount of leeway in voting more conservatively and
being more outspoken on hot-button issues. Research demonstrates that partisan constituencies
affect the voting habits and elections of their respective representatives (Druckman et al. 2013).
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Because of the safe nature of their districts, these representatives are not afraid of a challenger
from the Democratic Party. If anything, they are concerned about a primary fight from the right –
something ironically most notably done by the Tea Party. This phenomenon is predicted by the
concept of dynamic representation posited by Stimson et al. (2013), where politicians are rational
actors that make informed decisions based upon a position most likely to benefit them electorally
in the future.
When taken together, these district variables are a powerful force behind the voting
behavior of GOP House members. The differences seen between the TPC and ER’s further
illustrate the importance of constituency influence on roll call voting. In this case, it seems clear
that as Miller and Stokes (1963) posited, constituency views – or the legislator’s perception of
them – have influenced the legislators voting behavior. How accurate the legislators are in their
perception is examined in the next two sections of this chapter.

Constituencies: Demographic and Economic Metrics

As noted previously, diversity in a MOC’s district is another element central to the study
due to its affect on roll call voting and electoral responsibility for a legislator’s decision. There
is a great deal of research concerning constituency responsiveness of House members (Bond
1983; Bond et al. 1985; Davidson 1969; Fiorina 1974; Fenno 1978; Froman 1963; Kingdon
1966; Koetzle 1998). Though research differs as to whether constituency diversity leads to
increased competition in congressional elections (Bond et al. 1985, Koetzle 1998), it can be
deduced that if diversity leads to increased electoral competition, it also has an effect on the
representatives’ relationship and responsiveness to their constituents and their policy positions.
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Table 16: Means Comparison of Race by Group
Caucasian
Black
Hispanic

TPC
82.3%
10.6%
13.0%

ER
84.7%
8.0%
11.3%

Total
84.1%
8.7%
11.7%

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from The Clerk of the House and ProximityOne.

Because of this literature, constituencies are examined by investigating race, income,
unemployment, and education. These variables are based upon information from the 2008 and
2009 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS is an ongoing continuous survey conducted
by the United States Census Bureau that reaches about 2% of American households per year.
First of these variables to be examined is race. Information concerning race was collected
into three categories, Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic. For the statistical summary
provided later in the chapter, the variable provided is race non-African-American and Hispanic.
As seen in Table 16, there is minor variation amongst the TPC and ER’s. TPC constituencies are
more racially diverse than those of ER’s. These results are congruous with the conception of the
Tea Party as a mainly non-racially diverse movement, as TPC members on average represent
overwhelmingly Caucasian districts. Second, examining education, there is virtually no
difference between the TPC and ER’s when exploring high school graduation rates, with only a
one-percentage point difference between the two caucuses. The constituencies of TPC freshmen
had a slightly lower average of high school graduates, 83.47% to 86.48% of ER freshmen. No
difference was seen between the incumbents of the two groups.
Income and unemployment is examined next, as these two variables require independent
study because of these importance of these issues in 2010 as the U.S. continued to suffer from
the effects of ‘The Great Recession.’ Rae (2011, 8) compares the Tea Party movement with other
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“populist movements in US political history […] that […] have been particularly prevalent
during times of severe economic distress – the early 1890s, the 1930s, and the early 1990s.” Rae
(2011, 16) also notes that “the issues that drive [the Tea Party’s] mobilization have been
primarily economic in nature and of relatively recent origin – TARP, the stimulus package, the
health care bill, and, most importantly, the escalating federal budget deficit.” If the movement
was in fact largely driven by economic factors, then it is important to study the economic
characteristics of the constituencies represented by TPC members. These economic indicators
also have important consequences for the elite level because it leads to economic voting –
especially when the economic is weak. Economic voting is important because market conditions
play an important factor in congressional voting, especially in support for incumbent candidates.
Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) discovered that economic voting is general in nature and based on
collective economic judgments of the economy, not personal feelings.
Table 17 shows the median household income and mean unemployment rate of
congressional districts from 2009. TPC members represent constituencies that had a lower
median household income and lower unemployment rates than their GOP colleagues.

Table 17: Means Comparison of Economic Variables by Incumbency and Group

Median Household Income
Unemployment Rate

TPC
Freshmen
$44,444.18
10.347%

ER
Freshmen
$49,386.04
9.455%

TPC
Incumbent
$53,159.09
8.784%

ER
Incumbent
$54,428.09
9.517%

TPC
Total
$50,689.87
9.227%

ER
Total
$52,488.84
9.493%

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress, controlling for
incumbency in the 111th Congress. Numbers from 2009.
Significance test: Incumbency and income – Sig: .164
Significance test: Incumbency and unemployment – Sig: .304
Source: Original dataset based upon information from ProximityOne and the American Community
Survey.
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TPC members fall below the mean in both income and unemployment, by $1,352.94 and .2
percentage points respectively. Freshmen districts had lower income than incumbents. TPC
freshmen represented constituencies with a higher unemployment and drastically lower median
household income. ER freshman has lower income but also a slightly lower unemployment
rate.The difference between TPC freshmen and the Republican Conference as a whole was
nearly a $7,600 decrease in income and a .9 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.
As such, freshmen districts had weaker economic metrics than incumbents. Economic metrics
appear to be a factor in the election of TPC freshmen members in 2010, as their districts had
considerably weaker economic numbers than incumbents.
Lastly, significance tests are completed to determine if there is interaction between the
variables. Unlike the examination of congressional districts, and as displayed in Table 18, none
of the constituency variables examined were significant. The marked differences seen in
economic factors between freshmen members and their incumbent colleagues, particularly when
comparing the TPC and the ER’s are nonetheless interesting and require further analysis.

Table 18: Significance Tests of Constituencies
Variable
Race (non-Black and Hispanic) – 2009
Median household income – 2009
Percent change in median household income – 2008 to 2009
Unemployment rate – 2009
Change in unemployment rate – 2008 to 2009
High school graduates – 2009

Coefficient
-.134
-.061
.005
-.052
-.047
-.080

SE
.001
.000
.009
.013
.025
.006

Note: Dependent variable is Tea Party Caucus membership in the 112th Congress.
Source: Original dataset based upon information from ProximityOne, The Cook Political Report, and
other government agencies.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Electorate: Mass Level Opinion

To conduct this analysis, information from 2012 American National Election Study
(NES) was used. Six total variables were analyzed, two for each one of the three roll call voting
categories analyzed in the previous chapter. The dependent variable used was based on two
qualifications, 1) the respondent voted for the republican candidate, and 2) whether the
respondent was from a district represented by a TPC member. Democratic voters were dropped
from this analysis because of research by Clinton (2006), among others, who found that
representatives are more responsive to the preferences of same-party constituents.
Of the six variables selected from the ANES, a 7-point scale on government spending and
services and support for a tax on millionaires was used for economic variables. The two noneconomic variables chosen were a four-point abortion self-placement scale and support of gay
marriage. The two variables selected to examine foreign and security policy were opinions on
increasing or decreasing defense spending and approval of government efforts to reduce
terrorism. This mass level analysis results in contradictory results to those of the elite level study.

Table 19: Significance Tests of Mass Level Variables
Category
ECON
NECON
FOR

Variable
Government Services Spending
Tax on Millionaires
Abortion Self-Placement
Position on Gay Marriage
Defense Spending
Government Efforts to Reduce Terrorism

Coefficient
-.026
-.026
-.035**
.070***
-.038
-.028

SE
.012
.010
.007
.011
.011
.009

Note: Dependent variable based on two factors, 1) did the respondent vote for the Republican candidate,
and 2) was the respondent in a TPC district.
Source: American National Election Study 2012
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Where in the study of roll call voting, economic votes are found to be significant and the other
two categories are not, in the study of ANES data non-economic variables were found to be the
only ones significant below the .05 level as seen in Table 19.
The insignificance of the variable measuring support for a tax on millionaires is
interesting. The fiscal compromise package that ended the “Fiscal Cliff” in January 2013 – the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 – was the second most significant economic vote at
0.001. The main sticking point of the act was an increase in taxes for high-income earners,
specifically those make over $250,000 per year. The discrepancy between support for an increase
in taxes for high-income earners at the mass level and the inconsistency with the vote at the elite
level shows a discontinuity between the two levels. These discrepancies are either a result of a
failure in the causal model (Miller and Stokes 1963) or a more likely failure on the part of the
representatives themselves to accurately gauge the perceptions of their constituents. A third
option is that legislators are substituting their own views for those of their constituents, or these
views are heavily clouding their observation of their constituents. It would not be unthinkable to
surmise that TPC voting might be heavily influenced by the conservative economic agenda of the
Tea Party at the elite level. At the same time, economic conservatism is widely palatable
currently, while main tenants of social conservatism are not (e.g., increasing support for samesex marriage).
Mass Level Analysis Summary

At the elite level, significant differences are seen in terms of final passage and economic
votes. At the mass level, differences are only seen with non-economic variables in the analysis of
mass level opinions derived from the ANES. This discrepancy is interesting and shows a
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disruption between the two levels. Data on congressional districts shows that TPC are likely to
represent safe southern republican districts. Nearly all of these districts voted for the GOP
nominee in the past three presidential elections – President Bush, Senator McCain, and Governor
Romney, respectively. Constituency data shows that the election of freshmen members in 2010 –
especially those of the TPC – was seemingly heavily influenced by district-level factors,
particularly the safeness of electoral districts (CPVI, presidential vote) and their respective
census regions. These freshmen benefited heavily from Democratic overextension into
Republican leaning districts in 2006 and 2008, districts that were particularly hard hit by the
recession as seen in the data and evidenced by the low income and high unemployment in
freshman districts. Significance testing showed geographic and voting variables to be significant,
while income and unemployment were not. These district and constituency variables help to
explain the roll call voting behavior of MOC’s seen in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
With the analysis of the variables complete, I must now examine the implications of the
findings for the hypotheses as well as further research. The results of this study will also help to
either demonstrate or disprove popular notions about the Tea Party movement at both the elite
and mass levels. The tests of significance referenced in this chapter that are used for hypothesis
testing are found in their respective sections. The null hypothesis that there is no difference
between members of the TPC and ER’s can be rejected. Rejection occurs at both levels of
analysis.
As the data presented shows, and as seen in Figure 5, final passage votes show a higher
level of significance than procedural votes, perhaps because the media, activists and the public
are more attuned to final passage votes. While variance existed between final passage votes in at
least one of the vote categories, procedural votes received nearly unanimous in support in both
groups. Procedural votes displayed no significance or variance when examining them
collectively, via an additive index, or during the significance tests in any of the vote categories.
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Figure 5: Final Passage Roll Call Vote Averages by Category and Group
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House
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Figure 6: Procedural Roll Call Vote Averages by Category and Group
Source: Original dataset based upon information gathered from The Clerk of the House
Jessee and Theriault (2012, 14) find that “procedural votes are merely de facto declarations of
partisan identification quite unrelated to the underlying substance of the legislation” and that
MOC’s “vote with two different faces: one face for the less visible party-pressured procedural
votes and the other for the highly visible constituency pressured final passage votes.” This is
evidenced in Figure 6. The findings also show a high-level of cohesion amongst the TPC.
Hammond (1998, 179) found that caucus membership is a substantial factor in how MOC vote.
In addition, the fact that five of the eight (62.5%) final passage votes that exhibited significant
differences happened to be the most controversial and publicized pieces of legislation considered
during the112th Congress, shows the power of the TPC and its impact on Washington and the
American political system. With these results, hypothesis one is supported when examining
economic votes.
As expected, economic votes are significant – accounting for all eight of the roll calls
found to be statistically significant. The results are largely congruous with those of McNitt
(2012, 10), who found that TPC members cast “more conservative votes on budget and debt
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limitation legislation.” The results also show vast similarities between the TPC and ER’s,
particularly on non-economic, and foreign and security policy votes. This is congruent with
Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006) who found growing homogeneity amongst policy
positions in parties in government. The votes over the federal budget, debt ceiling, and taxes
were the most visible and highly contentious roll calls of the Congress. However, the debate over
patent reform – The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act – garnered nowhere near the attention of
the other significant votes. The same is true of transportation funding, the Moving Ahead for
Progress in the 21st Century Act. Determining why exactly patent reform drew the ire of the TPC
is outside the scope of this research; yet some members expressed concern over the transition
from a ‘first to invent’ to a ‘first to file’ patent system. Economic votes provided an opportunity
for TPC members to espouse what the Tea Party movement is popularly thought to stand for, a
smaller more limited government, and many did just that. Still other MOC’s used each vote as a
carefully planned political maneuver, appealing not only to members of the Tea Party movement
but also to the activists that helped to elect them as well as their constituents. With economic
votes showing significance while the other two roll call categories did not, hypothesis two is
supported.
Furthermore, administration support was found for ten roll calls, seven economic votes
and three foreign and security policy votes. Of these key votes, seven – all economic – were
found to be significant at or below the .05 level, with an average difference using means
comparison of 21.57 percentage points. It is noteworthy that a majority of these votes were
compromises between the administration and Republican leadership. These results appear
congruent with literature that finds animosity toward Obama to be a key factor in Tea Party
support (Jacobson 2011; Maxwell and Parent 2012). However, further study is required to
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determine how administration support specifically affected these votes. Hypothesis three is
supported, as seventy percent of votes receiving presidential support were significant.
Incumbency data shows significant variance between TPC members and ER’s, however
none of the incumbency variables were significant, and consequently hypothesis four is not
supported. However, the elite level results are contrary to the popular conception held by many
including Rae (2011, 19) who characterized the Tea Party as an insurgent and spontaneous
movement. Over two-thirds of TPC members in the 112th Congress were incumbents, with a
majority serving in Congress as far back as 2005. It was also discovered that members reelected
in 2012 were much more likely to originate from states where the redistricting process was
controlled by Republicans. Over half of members no longer serving in Congress emanated from
states where the redistricting process was either controlled by Democrats or where it was split
between parties. Though redistricting was found to not be statistically significant, these findings
are in line with research conducted by Squire (1995, 235), in which he found the parties that
controlled the redistricting process “won more seats than they had before redistricting and they
almost always held the seats created for them.” While the GOP did lose some seats in 2012,
Squire (1995) also found that incumbents, in the rare circumstances in which they lose
reelection, usually do so in ‘toss-up’ districts – similar findings are observed in Table 13.
Desposato and Petrocik (2003) similarly determine that the highest rate of incumbent losses
occur in the election immediately following redistricting.
Mass level analysis utilizing information on congressional districts and constituencies
yielded mixed results. The CPVI of congressional districts from both the 112th and 113th
Congresses were found to be significant, as well as census regions, and the 2004, 2008, and 2012
presidential vote at the same level. Taken together, these results paint a fuller picture of the
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districts represented by Republican House members, and especially those of the TPC. Members
of the TPC represent safe southern Republican districts that voted for GOP nominee in each of
the past three presidential elections. Because all six of these district-level variables were found to
be significant, hypothesis five is supported. These findings support Campbell and Putnam
(2011), Arceneaux and Nicholson (2012), and Abramowitz’s (2011) assertions that Tea Party
supporters are partisan Republicans. The constituency demographic and economic variables –
race, education, income, and unemployment education – were not to be significant. However,
these variables aid in completing the portrait of TPC constituencies and their influence on the
election and roll call behavior of their legislators. In addition, considerable differences were seen
in the economic metrics when comparing TPC members and ER’s and controlling for
incumbency. These differences likely played an influential role in the election of freshmen
members in 2010 and require further study.
The geographic and voting district variables – CPVI, presidential vote, region – provide
at least a partial explanation for members voting behavior. Clinton’s (2006) research on
Congressional roll call voting is significant to note because it was conducted during a period
when the GOP controlled the House (1995-2007), providing a similar period for analysis to the
present. Clinton (2006) found that majority-party Republicans were more responsive to the
preferences of same-party constituents. Due to these results, as well as a depth of literature on
constituency influence and economic voting (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Calvert 1985; Gerber
and Lewis 2004; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Miller and Stokes 1963; Stokes and Miller 1962;
Whitman 1990), hypothesis six is supported.
Contrary to the results in the analysis of elite level roll call voting, economic variables at
the mass level were not significant. Foreign and security policy variables were also not
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significant, the same as found previously. However, non-economic variables were highly
significant, both below the .05 level as seen in Table 19. The reversal of significance between
economic and non-economic varibales is significant to note, especially since only GOP voters
were analyzed. Illustrating a split between the elite and mass level, a number of the mean
comparison results are interesting. For instance, over sixty percent of Republican voters
supported raising taxes on millionaires. However, when examining the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012 – which ended the Fiscal Cliff by raising taxes on higher income Americans –
the vote was significant at the .001 level. The No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act from the
first session was insignificant at .640, yet the four-point self-placement scale on abortion in the
ANES was statistically significant below the .05 level. The ANES variables are a complete
reversal from the elite level in terms of economic and non-economic variables.
These results illustrate ideological and partisan polarization amongst elites. As elites have
become more polarized, voters have to a certain extent become more polarized as well. This
polarization at the mass level comes in multiple forms, including placement on the left-right
ideological spectrum, evaluations of party positions, as well as views on key issues. These results
are most likely to manifest in the most politically engaged part of the electorate (Abramowitz
2010; Abramowitz 2011). Most research focusing on mass polarization emphasizes the
importance of political elites (Hetherington 2001). Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011)
found that the Tea Party was largely funded by Republican business elites, and reinforced by a
conservative media – making the Tea Party an elite movement in the eyes of many researchers.
However, polarization at the mass level is not as pronounced as at the elite level, and as party
polarization has increased, mass level polarization has not grown by the same amount. This
disconnect may be because the majority of the electorate does not focus on politics (Layman,
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Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Further research needs to be completed to find the causal link
between elite polarization and that of the mass level. In addition, more research should be
conducted to assess how subgroups at the mass level affect the behavior of political and media
elites – a topic particularly important concerning the Tea Party movement.
This research was conducted cognizant of its limitations and opportunities for future
research. This paper’s main constraint is that only the self-identified members of the TPC were
subjected to heightened scrutiny as the congressional arm of the Tea Party movement. Further
research could broaden the scope of the dependent variable by using a different measure of Tea
Party support. Two models would be a measure of public statements of support for the
movement, or endorsements received by Tea Party organizations (Tea Party Express,
FreedomWorks, etc.). In addition, future research could focus on a historical comparison
between the Tea Party movement and the 2010 election, and a historically similar period. The
results from this analysis show the Tea Party’s effect on Congress and the American political
system, and preconceived notions of the movement and its members.

The Future of the Tea Party

At the beginning of the 111th Congress, Democrats held 256 seats in the House and 57 in
the Senate, including the two Independent senators that caucus with the Democrats. As explained
previously, this left the Democrats at a disadvantage of defending a large number of seats they had
gained in 2006 and 2008, many of them in districts that would normally lean towards the GOP. The

GOP was caught in a similar storm in 2012. For instance, in 2008 Democrats gained 21 House
seats, a third of the number Republicans did in 2010. A reasonable question to be asked then is
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did the Republicans overextend? More specifically, are members of the Tea Party Caucus that
overextension? Furthermore, what do these results say about 2014?
The main byproduct of the Tea Party movement in 2010 was its energy. However, the
Tea Party also likely cost the GOP control of the Senate in 2010 and 2012. Conservative Senate
candidates such as Sharon Angle (Nevada), Christine O’Donnell (Delaware), Todd Akin
(Missouri), and Richard Murdock (Indiana), all enjoyed Tea Party support and lost winnable
contests against Democrats. If in an election year where the incumbent Democratic president
won reelection with 51.1% of the popular vote, Democrats could only pick up eight House seats,
it is highly unlikely that the GOP would lose the seats necessary to lose their majority in 2014.
This scenario is also increasingly unlikely after examining the effects of the redistricting that
occurred after the 2010 Census, and because of the increasing safeness of GOP seats – fifty-two
of the members examined currently represent swing districts and none come from a Democratic
leaning district. A breakdown of House membership – as of March 2014 – is seen in Figure 7.

Democrats
199

ER
185
Republicans
TPC
48

Figure 7: 113th Congress, Breakdown by Party and Group
Note: Membership current as of March 2014
Source: Based upon information from The Clerk of the House
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Five of these seats are TPC members, credibly leaving forty-seven of the seats studied in play.
Due to the electorally safe nature of TPC districts, it is safe to assume that many of these
members could have been elected, and could be reelected without the Tea Party banner.
Statistician Nate Silver (2012) believes that due to the rise of hyperpartisan districts, there
are only about thirty-five true swing districts. Democrats would need to win more than half of
these seats to regain the gavel. The data shows that most members of the TPC should remain in
office for the 114th Congress, because forty-two of the members examined represent Republicanleaning districts. However, economic conditions while still likely to be the number one issue
facing voters, is not likely to be as important as it was in 2010. Concerns over foreign policy,
entitlement and defense cuts, and health care are likely to be salient issues. Chances are that at
least some of the five TPC members and forty-seven ER’s studied in swing districts will face a
competitive race. Barring a political scandal, economic downturn, or foreign intervention, the
preceding study allows me to hypothesize that Republicans are likely to retain their House
majority in the 114th Congress. This hypothesis is congruous with research (Erikson 1988) that
shows the president’s party often suffers an electoral decline in midterms – with the notable
exceptions of 1934 (Franklin Roosevelt), 1998 (Clinton), and 2002 (George W. Bush).
Following the historic 2008 election of our nation’s first African-American commanderin-chief, a group of conservatives wary of government policy gave rise to the Tea Party
movement. As noted by Jacobson (2011), the Tea Party “brought an intense, angry energy to the
Republican cause” in 2010 contributing to the GOP surge. Whether the group will provide this
same surge in 2014 is unknown. However, the Tea Party is without a doubt a powerful group that
has influenced local, state, and federal political races, affected economic and foreign policy, and
brought our nation to the brink of default and caused a government shutdown. The TPC has
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endured many public struggles with Boehner, most notable the debate over the raising of the
nation’s debt ceiling in August 2011 and the “fiscal cliff” in December 2012. The movement has
not only captivated our media but also the minds of ordinary Americans and political elites, and
has taken the American political system by storm.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES
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Elite Level Variables: Membership, Endorsements, Incumbency, and Redistricting
Variable
Description
Sources
Member of Congress
http://www.house.gov/representatives/
Tea Party Caucus Membership
112th Congress
Tea Party Caucus Membership
113th Congress
FreedomWorks Endorsement
2010
Sarah Palin Endorsement
2010
Tea Party Express Endorsement
2010
108th Congress Incumbency

http://bachmann.house.gov/
News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=226594
http://bachmann.house.gov/
News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=226594
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/special/politics/tea-party-endorsement-results/

1 = Member
0 = Non-member

1 = Endorsed
0 = Not-endorsed

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/special/politics/palin_tracker/
http://www.teapartyexpress.org/endorse-2010/

1 = Member
0 = Non-Member

http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/108/
house/members/
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/109/
house/members/
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/110/
house/members/
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/111/
house/members/
http://www.house.gov/representatives/

5 = Nonpartisan
4 = Nonpartisan Co.
3 = Democratic
2 = Split
1 = Republican

Process: http://www.ncsl.org/legislatureselections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissionstable.aspx
Partisanship: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/
2010_Legis_and_State_post.pdf

109th Congress Incumbency
110th Congress Incumbency
111th Congress Incumbency
113th Congress Incumbency
Redistricting State Legislative
Control
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112th Congress First Session Roll Call Vote Variables
Variable
Description
Sources
No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll286.xml
Act
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll292.xml
Federal funding of National Public
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll190.xml
Radio and the use of Federal funds
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll192.xml
to acquire radio content Act
Department of Defense and Full
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll266.xml
Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll268.xml
2011
“Cut, Cap and Balance”
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll604.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll606.xml
Authorizing the limited use of the United
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll492.xml
4
=
Non-Member
States Armed Forces in support of the
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll493.xml
3 = Not voting
NATO mission in Libya Act
2 = Present
August 2011 Debt Compromise
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll687.xml
1 = Yea
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll690.xml
0 = Nay
Repealing the Job-Killing Health
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll010.xml
Care Law Act
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll014.xml
Leahy Smith America Invents Act
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll465.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll491.xml
PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll376.xml
Paul Ryan FY 2012 Budget

P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll266.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll277.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll859.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll869.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll926.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll932.xml

Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act
National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012

Note: The procedural vote for the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 was not analyzed because it did not
receive a roll call vote.
Legend: P – Procedural Votes, F – Final Passage Votes
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112th Congress Second Session Roll Call Vote Variables
Variable
Description
Sources
Middle Class Tax Relief and
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll072.xml
Job Creation Act of 2012
Paul Ryan 2013 FY Budget
Violence Against Women Act
Repeal of Obamacare Act
Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act
Federal Reserve Transparency
Act of 2012
Red Tape Reduction and Small
Business Creation Act
District of Columbia Pain-Capable
Unborn Child Protection Act
FISA Amendments Act
Reauthorization Act of 2012
2013 Continuing Appropriations
Resolution
National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2013
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012

4 = Non-Member
3 = Not voting
2 = Present
1 = Yea
0 = Nay

P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll140.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll151.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll255.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll258.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll457.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll460.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll166.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll451.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll513.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll536.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll539.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll561.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll569.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll573.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll579.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll642.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll645.xml
P: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll658.xml
F: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll659.xml

Note: The procedural votes for the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Federal Reserve
Transparency Act of 2012, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Creation Act, and the District of Columbia
Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act were not analyzed because they did not receive a roll call vote.
Legend: P – Procedural Votes, F – Final Passage Votes
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Mass Level Variables: Congressional Districts, Constituencies, and ANES
Variable
Description
Sources
Cook Partisan Voting Index
6 = Non-member
http://cookpolitical.com
112th Congress
5 = Strong Dem
4 = Weak Dem
Cook Partisan Voting Index
http://cookpolitical.com
3 = Swing
113th Congress
2 = Weak GOP
1 = Strong GOP
District Presidential Vote
http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/
files/pvistate.pdf
2004
District Presidential Vote
2008
District Presidential Vote
2012
Census Region

1 = Democratic
0 = Non-Democratic

http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/
files/pvistate.pdf
http://www.cookpolitical.com/sites/default/
files/pvistate.pdf

4 = West
3 = South
2 = Midwest
1 = Northeast

http://www.census.gov/geo/mapsdata/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf

Percent Race (Non-African-American and
non-Hispanic) 2009
Percent High School Graduates 2009

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Unemployment Rate 2009

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Unemployment Rate Change 2008-09

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Median Household Income 2009

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Median Household Income Change 2008-09

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Government Services Spending

ANES 2012

Tax on Millionaires

ANES 2012

Abortion Self-Placement
Position on Gay Marriage

http://proximityone.com/cd.htm

Respective
point-scales

ANES 2012
ANES 2012

Defense Spending

ANES 2012

Government Efforts to Reduce Terrorism

ANES 2012
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